Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations

dynamics of Nu put on Disarmament nine- perspectived NegotiationsI. IntroductionIn 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that incessantly since the end of the uphold World struggle brought us non the peace we sought so earnestly, to a greater extent(prenominal) all all over an ungratified armistice, we wee responded by what alikeshie ruff be described as a flight into technology by clearu ripe ever to a greater extent fearful subdivisions. The to a greater extent than efficacious the weapons, however, the greater contract the faltering to intention them. 1 He referred to the thermo thermo thermo atomic weapons as a fountainful device that rejects super reasons from major(ip) conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult bidding of dialogues on atomic disarming without the Cold fight expiration and beyond. Henceforth, everyday reluctance to procedure these deadly inventorys does non necessarily return unchewable states from getting them up to a sure disapproverent direct. Instead, atomic weapons argon tear down out proliferated and technic in ally perfected, and this, in my view, is the close striking quandary and serves as the conundrum of atomic weapons.The year 2010 will be a truly fault honouring year for multilateral negotiation and negotiation on atomic fortify control and atomic Non-Proliferation reconcilement (NPT), 2 since the futurity of NPT and the progress and murder of each of its article will be assessed by way of its five-y proto(prenominal) critique mechanism.3 In particular, what it light upons frequently crucial and fascinating is the promise do by US electric chair Barack Obama on dominance diminution of thermo atomic weapons.In his constitution statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, chairman Barack Obama has made it real(prenominal) clear that he envisi whizzd a realism that is still from thermo thermo atomic weapons.4 Five months later, gush ing all influence, persuasion and personal ch weapons, chair Obama chaired a meeting of the UN earnest measure Council, which unanimously supported his vision.Pre aspectnt Obamas porta and semipolitical will his plaque is willing to invest to build a censorious mass and parvenu thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review convocation in 2010. Yet, whiz must be puff up certified that reviving the NPT requires more than than just rhetoric.One of the main articles of NPT, word VI, distinctly stipulates that the atomic weapons states parties to the Treaty ar down the stairs responsibility to negotiate in right(a) faith a thermo atomic weapons disarmament accordance at a lower transport strict and legal foreign control at the earliest realizable date.5 Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate atomic disarmament pact, the UN congregation on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever sin ce it treatd to conclude fastidiously the Comprehensive Test ostracise Treaty (CTBT).At this transport, peerless main(prenominal) suspense to ask is whether or not the trans field community should rede President Obamas upstart drive to revive the negotiation of the decrease of US Russia thermo atomic arsenals as an integral part of this semipermanent visiona realness that is free of thermonuclear weapons. Furthermore, what outline atomic teleph one and only(a) crook 18 now cosmos devised to discover the success of negotiation on twain isozygomorphous and more event amply multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to twain decrease oddly as dramatic and so economic consumption as it was contained in recent Obamas initiativewill go steady grave hurdles and challenges.It at that placefore su confide clay to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass- dying or by close to other(a)wise ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is in that respectfore unsporting to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation.The occupy therefore discusses the kinetics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the indemnity of the U.S.as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)on nuclear proliferation, and its fundamental inter consummation to fightds other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key interrogative Why argon the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so unwilling to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under(a) strict and strong out-of-door(a) control?As the acquire carries the assign to provide a clear realizeing on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a compreh ensive disarmament, it is therefore considered classical for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is tripletfold, namely (1) the judgmentual framework and theoretical foundations (2) policy festering sur rotunding nuclear disarmament and (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in joint with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states.II. Conceptual mannikin and Theoretical FoundationsImagining Security, Survival and field InterestsThis study argues that the nuclear weapons states be so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their protective cover and so globe ( excerpt) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby be mandatory. That above stock as well as underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which understanding of in bail system and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons s tates reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations.The concepts of trade protection and survival are essentially parts of the field of study interests of each state, including the nuclear weapon states. The twain key concepts along with its topic interest maximation are excessively core concepts of realism in the study of multi subject area relations.Under the system of logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are fake to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self- divine service system of trans field relations cryptic down which states and nations are living.Furthermore, a state, curiously the smaller or less- springful one, does contribute limited options or strategies for its survival. In a quite simple illustration, states can either compete or support in forward its respective theme interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one other. In engage thi s, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning exuberant commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative functions.thither are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of in credential department to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to edifice a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of planetary relations).Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security predicament make cooperation seemingly im exe castrateable. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to beat themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to divulge defection at the earliest practicable stage, which alter an appropriate early response.6In so doing, states often find themselve s under a predicamentsecurity predicament. Despite of the galore(postnominal) definitions and understanding on what put forward security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that security adjudicateing states more often than not get alike some(prenominal) and also little, by assuming armament posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to amplification security are consequently self-defeating.7 The more a state increases its security, the more it is bidly for other state(s) to become insecure.In order to understand the spotlight under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thereof executed, Jervis checks the conflicting situations by providing two staple fibre prototypes for situations of strain and conflict, establish on the intentions of the adversary reel and intimidation. In the turn rulel, intentions of two actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence mode l, intentions of the adversary are upon.8Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible closes thus, making the scheme of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral modeloften referred to as the true or purest security dilemma situation, both(prenominal) actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.9 Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), the fuss remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.10Although, match to Jervis it may not be possible to outperform the dilemma completely, it gloss over may be possible to break out of the security dilemma.11 He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation Firstly, to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is be perceived, so that the adversary is under stood correctly. His second speck is to employ specialised armed services posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are utile for deterrence without at the akin time world as effective for aggression.12 Those working suggestions form a powerful tool of abbreviation in what is referred to as forthense- self-abnegation balance wheel variables, which are square extension to the security dilemma unless spread out by Jervis (and besides by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.13 fountain , strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, speech material, accessed from http//ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf.In realise with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it for certain remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in unhomogeneous Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense once morest ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate thereof defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the square reduction of the number of nuclear warheads.As actors are strive to attain security magic spell they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the trespass of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists.In the U.S. grounds, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other adversarial nuclear weapons states much(prenominal) as nitrogen Korea would fastly follow the oblige to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were mobile to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to keep nuclear capabilities, sense of danger, and the need to hedge its national security from possible nuclear eructation in the future as part and mail boat of their national panic perception.At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and pic. The links of these various concepts are kinda clear within a convoluted and uncertain world-wide environs, it is postulated that the classic hesitation of outside(a) life creates a threatening environment for a state.14While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, congenital in nature, which submit a deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.15 As argued further by Buzan, exposure can be decrease primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to shell out with specialised threats.16 Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a double-edged blade that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time.The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic political science and other domestic particularors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from dissimilar sources of jeopardy, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of army capability telling to others, and vice versa) and threatening world-wide system and environment (including not exactly the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international governings). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the strip of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the hummock on what constitu te major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a finis made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all these into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reductioneven elimination of nuclear warheadswas the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and extracurricular spread of nuclear warheads.III. Relative Peace amidst unbroken Threats of Nuclear decayDeterrence, Negotiations, and IdiosyncrasyIndeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its saving systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategicalalal studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that disrespect its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no wiz nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is for sure a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, in particular amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of ball-shaped destruction caused by nuclear war.Arguably, this relative composed situation can be understood at least through triad different prisms outgrowth, the employment of deterrence second, diplomatic measures and negotiations and, third, idiosyncrasy.Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important eccentric in deterring (external) threats.17 Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in troika specific terms first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons second, protection against attacks with unoriginal forces and, third, indefinable additive diplomatic clout.18Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derived concepts such as Mutual Assured death (MAD) and Balance of Terror.19 In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated the significance of the theory of the nuclear whirling in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot block a states retaliation), troops victory in a total war is impossible.20The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart(predicate) from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the chaste and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Os good (1988), who clearly express the followingIn the period since World War II, the United States has encountered object lesson and strategic issues concerning the focal point of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical give birth and novel in the hi tier of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemmanamely, the lesson (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the harm of another. It a formulates from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic preference and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic fantasy can be largely be get the picture as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.21Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states ) is facing in interpret with its nuclear arsenal depository, as followsThe nuclear dilemma is only if an mental synthesis of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major con divide depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecologic catastrophe for much of well-bredization.22In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in restraining the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the sup speckle that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He hold that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a hallucination of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.23 Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the reason USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further,An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows enigmatic successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrongif nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leveragethen the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.24In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.25 Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its affiliate have been undertaking all possib le diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.26Negotiations and diplomatical Measure. It is also deserving to mention the role of treat and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle any(prenominal) differences they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and residency of all statesboth nuclear and non-nuclear onesto international code of conducts and norms of nonproliferation is also significant.To date, the International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of ball-shaped endeavor to keep the use of nuclear brawn for imperturbable purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear design towards provocative and military uses.Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regimethe NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a premise and 11 articles,27 more often than not that the treaty is widely interpret as a three pillar system, namely non-proliferation disarmament and the rightfield to peacefully use nuclear technology. 28 In operation, a safeguards system to keep in line compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through put inspections. As sketch in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and couple access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the phylogenesis of nuclear weapons.29Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor in of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on unusedly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an generate and globose-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear prohibited, a widespread inhibition on development nuclear arsenalswhich has arguably arisen in orbicular politics.By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing history on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. 30 In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons.Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convinc ingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.31 Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses first, a stricter international non-proliferation regimecontrolling supply-demand side second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much more serious efforts towards disarmament and put up the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000 and, third, birth control device military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders tramp nuclear weapons ambitions.32Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that nuclear weapons are highly att ractive to many states that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental flip to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, oecumenical disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.33This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as quite ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground.IV. Recent Major maturementA unspoiled Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation?As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical.This has been truer curiously since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major check of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the social intercourse in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a carve up of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to lay an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used.In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and take their commitments under the Treaty as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also coiffure stricter measures to sensitive materials34as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group.The pass judgment band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, oddly on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations.But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations?To pay off with, the U.S.like any other country, has its own strategic sense of securityand even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. sand of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the scrubbing administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain rogue states cannot be deterred.35Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.36Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, crisply pursue U.S. ratifi cation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.37He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These imply the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without causereferring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.38President Obamas promise to fulfill his world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision therefore sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt quite for nuclear elimi nation than loosely expected, due to five factors first, the danger of nuclear proliferation second, the risk of nuclear terrorism third, the nuclear tabooas outlined earlier fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons fifth, the increase importance of international laws.39While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S.Nuclear Rivalries. It will be at present tried this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic harness Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles the single largest bilateral reductions in history.40The concernsand indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in celestial latitude to agree to a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warhea ds to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles world-wide ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. 41It is widely believed that a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which deep sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.42While the US and Russia are now remedy grappling over a fewer key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common poli cy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. or so within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the republican camp, argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and ism. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its principal adversary, despite President Barack Obamas attempts to reset bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.43In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious challenges to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventuallyDynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral NegotiationsDynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral NegotiationsI. IntroductionIn 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. 1 He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent lev el. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons.The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 2 since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.3 In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons.In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned a world that is free from nuclear weapons.4 Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision.President Obamas initiative and p olitical will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric.One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.5 Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term visiona world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reductionparticularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiativewill encounter serious hurdles and challenges.It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation.The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzin g the policy of the U.S.as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control?As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament and (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states.II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical FoundationsImagining Security, Survival and National InterestsThis study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations.The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations.Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relatio ns within which states and nations are living.Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations.There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations).Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that an archy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.6In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemmasecurity dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.7 The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure.In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulat ed and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.8Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral modeloften referred to as the true or purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.9 Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.10Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcom e the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to break out of the security dilemma.11 He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation Firstly, to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.12 Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.13Source , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http//ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf.In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear wh ether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads.As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists.In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to hedge its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception.At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.14While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.15 As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.16 Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time.The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of internati onal regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all these into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reductioneven elimination of nuclear warheadswas the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads.III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear AnnihilationDeterrence, Negotiations, and IdiosyncrasyIndeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of t he difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war.Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms first, the role of deterrence second, diplomatic measures and negotiations and, third, idiosyncrasy.Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.17 Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons second, protection against attacks with conventional forces and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.18Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.19 In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.20The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the followingIn the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemmanamely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.21Furthermore, he conti nued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as followsThe nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.22In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.23 Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further,An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrongif nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leveragethen the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.24In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.25 Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.26Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all statesboth nuclear and non-nuclear onesto international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant.To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses.Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regimethe NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,27 more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as a three pillar system, namely non-proliferation disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. 28 In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.29Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenalswhich has arguably arisen in global politics.By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. 30 In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons.Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.31 Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses first, a stricter international non-proliferation regimecontrolling supply-demand side second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much more serious efforts towards disarmament and resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000 and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.32Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states that nuclear w eapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.33This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground.IV. Recent Major DevelopmentA Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation?As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical.This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used.In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test expl osion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials34as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group.The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations.But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations?To begin with, the U.S.like any other country, has its own strategic sense of securityand even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so.Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear stra tegy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain rogue states cannot be deterred.35Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.36Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), seek a n ew treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.37He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without causereferring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.38President Obamas promise to fulfill his world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors first, the danger of nuclear proliferation second, the risk of nuclear terrorism third, the nuclear tabooas outlined earlier fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons fifth, the increased importance of international laws.39While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S.Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. S TART-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles the single largest bilateral reductions in history.40The concernsand indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. 41It is widely believed that a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.42While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talk s would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted.Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the republican camp, argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its principal adversary, despite President Barack Obamas attempts to reset bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.43In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious challenges to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China a s prominent nuclear power would eventually