In the era after the Cold War, liberalism has replaced realism as the dominant explanation for the international system” Do you agree with this assertion?

IntroductionThis essay examines the proposition that, in the era afterwards the refrigerated contend, heavy(p)ism has replaced naturalism as the dominant expla dry land for the external frame, arguing that such(prenominal) is not the case that naturalism continues to be relevant and, indeed, perhaps offers fracture explanations for genuine beingness-wide semipolitical science that devoidism. In particular(a), this essay focuses on the Waltzian conceit of orbicular anarchy and asymmetrical global actor distri stillions as beingness primary driving agencies in international affairs. Hence this essay espouses the precepts of neorealism, emphasising the spl oddityour of military unit, dominance, and interest as rudimentary political behaviour. while this essay acknow takeges the ideologic primacy of unspecificism, and the likelihood that this forget increase, it draws a distinguishableion betwixt avowed clever affinities and observable political realities. T hat is, the central high-mindedness of the liberal ethos is dissected and constitute to be unsatisfactory in accounting the for post- rimed War global order. while the importance of liberalism is not refuted, the current study sees its ascendency as resulting more than from a lack of viable alternatives than its fundamental superiority as a political system or as a set of ideas.realism, encompassingism, and the Centrality of world power and Interest in International traffic In the wake of the frigid War, received deprecative voices within the orbital cavity of International Relations range the demise of realism as the dominant explanation for the international system. Certainly, scholars advert that liberalism is main alternative to realism in the public discourse, as it has been for dickens centuries, albeit challenged by socialism for a time (Richardson, 2001 71). This supposition is founded on the printing that the primary tenets of realism like global anarchy, the centrality of the state, and corollary importance of power and opportunism while previously useful in explaining global politics, brace been superseded by alternate theories. Hence scholars bemuse that although realisms concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power match may accept been appropriate to a byg bingle era, they have been displaced by changed full terms and eclipsed by better ideas (Little & Smith, 2006 90). The realist paradigm as formulated by Machiavelli and codify by Hobbes, it could be argued, was grounded in paranoiac conceptualisations of the human being condition it reflected an anti-teleological formula, where the Aristotelian idea of ultimate good as worldly concerns guiding light is rejected in favour of a motivation formed in the philosophical negative (Strauss, 1988 52) where humans ultimately acted to quash certain ends rather than precipitate them. For Hobbes, one of the intellectual fathers of the modern nation state, mans endeavour was consequen tly geargond, in sum, against what he called the summum malum, that is, ending (Sreedhar, 2010 33).Modern political science tends to ascribe somewhat less disheartened intentions and driving agencies to international transaction. While this has somewhat to do with the inevitable critical realignment that obtained as a result of global political rearrangement after the course of the Soviet bloc, the irrelevance of realism is by no involves a given. As the neorealist Kenneth Waltz avers deviates in the structure of the system be distinct from changes at the unit level (2000 5). After all, it would entail a primary change in world politics to negate entirely a prevalent mode of critical analysis for realism all of a sudden to become irrelevant. This would, it seems clear, be to say that the events of the past were so vastly different in disposition from those of the present as to bear measly if any consequence for (or insights on) events of the future. save wha t manner of change in the international system could utterly alter the critical apparatuses by which such systems are scrutinisedWhat we are concerned with in this instance, after all, is a wholly impudently type of system in effect, a crude type of politics wherein the posited spread of liberalism, increasing globalisation, interdependence, the rise of democracy and the consolidation of diplomatic relations is such as to redefine the genuinely nature of state-to-state interaction a very dramatic alteration indeed. In sum, is the modern face of global order really musing of an equally new modus operandi at snip infraIs liberalism the new residing paradigm?Since the end of the frigorific War, scholars have proposed that a new world is upon us, one which requires new approaches to political analysis. As a consequence, the field of political studies has witnessed a wealth of competing so-called new world theories Francis Fukuyamas proposed End of History and Samuel P. Huntingt ons Clash of Civilisations theory being initiatory among them. A common thread in utter theories relates to the potent ideologic signifi tummyce of communism being abjured by a huge depute of the globe and the consequent spread of liberal democracy and its bedfellow capitalism. In each instance, the charge of occidental triumphalism could be brought to bear and, indeed, raises some pertinent questions is it that Western liberalism is a superior system or is it that Eastern style communism was integrally flawedSome scholars certainly contend the latter communist political systems collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s generally because of long-standing internal weaknesses that denied them the popular legitimacy needed for long term extract (Goldman, 1997 3). From a liberal perspective, this can be understood as reflective of the supposed fundamental human liking for freedom a desire which proponents are keen to imply that liberalism provides. That is , in that location is for some liberal critics a belief that the desire for liberal democracy is universal because it denotes the innate human desire for freedom (Hughes, 2012 109). However, the categorical and reductive overtones of such thinking are perhaps too flattering to the Occidental political position (from which liberal critics tend to hail).At any rate, it is clear that liberal politics have become increasingly preponderate in the wake of the Cold War. Whether this is shoot to the universality of liberal principles is highly debatable. More convincing are arguments that tune the lack of viable alternatives to communism since the befall of the Soviet bloc. Hence one critic observes that following the Cold War, liberal democracy found itself without enemies or viable alternatives (Haynes et al., 2013 36). Concurrently, the United States (certainly the most prevalent liberal polity on the world stage), increasingly pursued policies that were indicative of ideological uni versalism in value and practices (MacGinty & Richmond, 2013 22). Such universalism wee-wees somewhat to blur the lines between liberal principles and US principles simply put, the one comes metonymically to do duty for the other. As a result, scholars posit that American power has become the executor of the liberal idea and, invisibly, the liberal ideal has become the occasion for asserting American might (MacDonald, 2014 161). In other words, the diminishment in viable alternatives to communism, in addition to the rise of US proclamations in the service of liberalism, both amount to a powerful accelerator for political liberalism overall.What is clear, then, is that at that place has been a substantial paradigm shift in the global order and, indeed, the proclamations of a supposed new word do seem justified, at least in terms of the overt ideological dynamic at play in international relations. What liberal scholars cornet as the ascendency of liberalism must be understood as an ideological victory before anything else. Deeper rooted structural and socio-cultural influences may hitherto obtain. As a result, while classical realism may be unfitting to account for the ideological makeup of present-day(a) politics, neorealism and structural realism can perhaps offer an adapted understanding of fundamental driving agencies tail assembly ideological ambitions. Such critical perspectives relate to the underlying mechanics of global politics. Kenneth Waltz for instance maintains the validity of realism inasmuch as it serves to explain states of relation back peace and conflict as being the result of asymmetrical power distribution among states and the prevalence of global anarchy. For Waltz, this mode of anarchy is connected with tolerance where the lack of any top-down international ruling body or sovereign effectively removes deterring agencies (for states to wage war). Hence Waltz identifies what he calls permissive causes of conflict that allow wars to occur because there is nothing to prevent them (1959 232).Of course, there has been a significant decline in interstate war since the fall of communism, but this does not mean that global anarchy in no longer relevant. Rather, the realist paradigm may still be said to hold true the just difference is the vastly changed power structures at work. The world order is, for the present, unipolar, with the United States representing the global hegemon. During the Cold War, international relations were bipolar, because the Soviet bloc represented a significant balance to the capitalist West. This led to a situation where, although individual factions often sought to dominate, superiority was closely impossible to achieve because states countered each others attempts to dominate (DAnieri, 2011 69). In lieu of this bipolar balance, no single state commands the resources or dexterity to challenge the US, thus what is known as hegemonic stableness obtains. While this hegemonic stability main tains a peaceful status quo under the banner of liberal democracy, there are nonetheless indications that other factors are at work beneath the overt appearance. Indeed, the unipolar world has allowed for a degree of unilateralism that seems distinctly at odds with the dictates of freedom and equality so associated with the liberal ideal. One beholder notes, for example, that the excessive unilateralist behaviour of the Bush administration in addition to the usual disregard for international law which previous administrations had helped to create ended up being corrosive on the credibility of Washington (Heinbecker, 2011 171).The point is that the US is simultaneously putting itself forward as the vocal exemplar of liberalism yet repeatedly acting in its own self-interest and flexing its muscle in order to do so. Thus while on the one kick the bucket the US explicitly champions liberal ideology, its political behaviour is more quickly explicable with reference to realist ideas. There is an evident paradox at work here, and it is evocative of Mark twains famed aphorism If you have a reputation as an early riser, you can sleep til twelve noon (Rumsey, 2012 137). Hence we come to a crucial distinction in the current debate. Liberalism is at base an idealistic mould for political action, thus difficult to achieve. Realism, contrarily, assumes a degree of pragmatism, partiality, and, indeed, disparity in political action that is furthermost more readily obtained. This central paradox echoes one of the primary problems with the liberal ethos as a practicable set of ideas it tends not to work very well. Hence scholars like Michael Howard go so far as to liken liberalism with the story of the efforts of good men to abolish war but only succeeding thereby in making it more terrible (Howard, 1978 130). victorious this point of view, it becomes less convincing that liberalism has rendered realism obsolete.Indeed, the actions of the US after the Cold War have, it can be argued, been highly self-interested. Moreover, after the tragedy of kinsfolk 11th, Washingtons neoconservative quest to spread democracy was anything but peaceful. In either instance, self-preservation and national interest seem more commonsense explanations for Washingtons actions than any supposed idealistic liberalising agenda (except where such an agenda consolidated US power). Thus we can once more defer to realist thinking. In this respect scholars point to the central role of power in politics and the dominance of the nation-state in the contemporary international system a realist conception if ever there was one (Keohane, 1984 9). Even though the power divisions that prevailed during the Cold War are now gone, this does not mean the fundamental concepts of power and dominance no longer play an grievous role. Here we come to a very important point the ideas of realism relate to fundamental driving agencies, which effectively transcend the nonfunctional prescripti ons of particular ideological systems. This is why, critics argue, realism offers a good explanation for political action at law because it tries to locate root causes. This latter point is realisms paramount strength.Because realism is concerned with human nature and fundamental agency, it potentially represents a more universal system of thought than does liberalism. For this reason, realism cannot be said to have been rendered obsolete by the rise of liberalism this is because, in a certain sense, the realist view is ahistorical and thus cannot be made obsolete. Realism after all is focused on the constraints on politics imposed by human nature (Donnelly, 2000 9). Human nature has no time limit. wherefore this is to suppose that power, dominance and self-interest are integral elements of the human condition that political events thus reflect human nature writ large. While it may be upheld that the human condition is not as devoid as Hobbes contended solitary, poor, brutish, nasty and short it can certainly be argued humanity continuously acts in selfish and illiberal ways (cited in Graham, 2002 9). Furthermore, it seems idealism in the extreme to propose that humanity is remotely close to a state in which the pejorative dimensions of human nature entrust be extinguished. Rather, it is far more plausible that human nature will eternally pose restraints on political ideals. Liberalism as an idealistic perspective thence remains subject to the restrictions posited by realism. Further, this does not look set to end any time soon.ConclusionWhile it is clear that a new world has emerged from the ideological rubble of the Cold War, a world define by the liberal ideal, it is certainly not proven that realism has no more use to political science. On the contrary, realism is a pervasive system for explaining international relations prior to and succeeding the end of the Cold War. Realism may relate to some very old political ideas but this does not mean su ch ideas are ipso facto out of date. complete elements of human nature, on the contrary, must be understood as timeless. In consequence, we may posit that the basic motivations that dictate human political employment today are of a similar nature to those during the Cold War or even those which obtained in centuries prior. That is to say, assuming the truth of the basic tents of realism about human nature, such insights must be taken to be as valid today as they were in the past. Following this logic, realist ideas will likely persist in relevance through the years to come. The conflict-based character of international relations will therefore continue to be a pressing concern for political science, even if liberalism continues its likely trend of preponderance. But this must be understood as an ideological manifestation, a cosmetic facet of political ideals and such ideals are wont to change dramatically over time. Even a cursory review of the previous carbon demonstrates dramat ic changes in political ideas. The overall political sensibility of contemporary polities is starkly different from that which obtained at the dawn of the twentieth century. Based on this observation, it seems reasonable to suppose a similar level of difference between now and one hundred years hence yet, even so, the underlying characteristics of human nature will be continuous. For this reason, realism remains and will continue to be relevant.ReferencesDAnieri, P., 2005. International Politics Power and inclination in Global Affairs. Boston, MA Wadsworth.Donnelly, J., 2000. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.Goldman, M. F. (1997) Revolution and Change in Eastern Europe. New York M. E. Sharpe.Graham, G., 2002. The Case Against the Democratic State An canvass in Cultural Criticism. Thorverton Imprint Academic.Haynes, J., Hough, P., Malik, S., & Pettiford, L., 2013. World Politics International Relations and Globalisation in the 21st Century. Oxon Routledge.Howard, M., 1978. War and the Liberal Conscience second ed. London Hurst.Hughes, C., 2012. Liberal Democracy as the End of History Fukuyama and postmodern Challenges. Oxon Routledge.Keohane, R. O., 1989. After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton Princeton University PressLittle, R. & Smith, M., 2006. Perspectives on World Politics. London Routledge.MacDonald, M., 2014. Overreach Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq. Harvard Harvard University Press.MacGinty, R. & Richmond, O., 2013. The Liberal Peace and Post-War Reco Myth or RealityOxon Routledge.Richardson, J. L., 2001. Contending Liberalisms in World Politics political orientation and Power. Boulder Rienner Publishers.Rumsey, M. G., 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Leadership. Oxford Oxford University Press.Sreedhar, S., 2010. Hobbes on Resistance Defying the Leviathan. New York Cambridge University Press.Waltz, K., 2000. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Secu rity, 25.1, pp. 5-41.Waltz, K., 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York Columbia University Press.